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The intense public interest in Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv-
ices,' was understandable. If present rates continue, nearly half of all
American women will have an abortion at some point in their lives.
2
The Supreme Court's decision, however, lacked almost any intima-
tion of the social, economic, and health consequences of the course
upon which at least four of the Justices have embarked. The Court's
prevailing opinions, moreover, failed to meet the most minimal stan-
dards of sound judicial decisionmaking.
In Roe v. Wade, 3 the Supreme Court held that the right to have
an abortion was a constitutional liberty of fundamental importance.
Under Roe, a state could force a woman to continue a pregnancy only
by demonstrating a compelling reason.4 The Webster plurality aban-
doned this standard ofjudicial protection without any serious expla-
nation of why, sixteen years after Roe, the right to have an abortion is
no longer fundamental.
The Webster plurality's backdoor approach allowed it to eviscer-
ate Roe without explicitly overruling the case. The opinion neither
rejected the long line of decisions supporting a fundamental interest
in critical aspects of family relations and procreation, nor distin-
guished those established rights from abortion. Moreover, the Court
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did not offer any reason to accord dispositive, overriding weight to a
state's assertion of a compelling interest in all fertilized ova. The
plurality only implicitly suggested that a woman's right to choose to
terminate a pregnancy would no longer receive heightened judicial
protection. In these ways, the Court avoided explicitly overruling
Roe, or even confronting the arguments that have emerged over the
past sixteen years in defense of Roe. The end result was that the
Webster plurality rejected a decision recognizing a fundamental con-
stitutional right without explaining what, if anything, was wrong with
the decision.
I. THE PLURALITY OPINION IN WEBSTER
Although dismantling Roe was not necessary to deciding the
Webster case, 5 the plurality seized the occasion to suggest that the
abortion right is no longer fundamental. Rather than requiring a
narrowly tailored compelling governmental interest, the plurality
opinion cryptically notes: "we are satisfied that the requirements of
these tests permissibly furthers the State's interest in protecting poten-
tial human life, and we therefore believe [the viability testing
requirements] to be constitutional." 6 Although this statement might
have meant only that the state's regulation had not unduly burdened
the fundamental right, the next paragraph suggests that the plurality
now considers the abortion right less than fundamental.
The experience of the Court in applying Roe v. Wade in later cases
.. .suggests to us that there is wisdom in not unnecessarily
attempting to elaborate the abstract differences between a 'funda-
mental right' to abortion, as the Court described in Akron a 'limited
fundamental constitutional right,' as Justice Blackmun's dissent
today treats Roe as having established, . . . or a liberty interest pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause, which we believe it to be.
7
In the past, when the Supreme Court departed from principles
of stare decisis, the change was usually due to major factual, economic,
or social changes that had rendered a former opinion obsolete, or
because courts or agencies administering the rules found them
unworkable. At a minimum, the lack of such changes would seem to
5 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057 (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 3058 (citations omitted).
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call for the plurality to provide a powerful explanation of Roe's
deficiencies. 8
The plurality did not attack Roe itself, though, but rather its what
it referred to as "rigid trimester framework." In five brisk
paragraphs, fourJustices deemed the framework "unsound in princi-
ple and unworkable in practice." 9 They suggested that the Roe
"framework" was "unworkable in practice" because it resulted in a
"web of legal rules that have become increasingly intricate resem-
bling a code of regulations rather than a body of constitutional doc-
trine."' The "framework" was "unsound in principle" because its
"key elements [could not be] found in the text of the Constitution,"
and because Roe failed to justify fetal viability as the point at which
the state's interest in protecting potential human life becomes com-
pelling. 1 These criticisms of Roe have been repeated so often in the
popular media that many assume their accuracy; they cannot, how-
ever, withstand serious scrutiny.
A. The Unworkability Assertion
The plurality claimed that Roe is "unworkable" without compar-
ing its "workability" to any other area of law, and without inquiring
whether lower courts had had any difficulty applying Roe. Suggesting
that Roe created a "rigid trimester framework," a "virtual Procrus-
tean bed," and an "intricate" "web of legal rules" was rhetorical
obfuscation. Once the Court establishes a constitutional principle,
there are always questions about how specifically its opinion should
guide legislators and lower courts. This is a prudential task, one call-
ing for judicial discretion. It is not a matter that undermines the
principle's legitimacy or functional workability.
8 The ChiefJustice is, of course, right in stating that stare decsis "has less power
in constitutional cases." Id. at 3056. Still, as former Justice Lewis Powell noted:
There are especially compelling reasons for adhering to stare decisis
in applying the principles of Roe v. Wade. That case was considered with
special care. It was first argued during the 1971 Term, and reargued-
with extensive briefing-the following Term. The decision was joined by
The ChiefJustice and six otherJustices. Since Roe was decided in January
1973, the Court repeatedly and consistently has accepted and applied the
basic principle that a woman has a fundamental right to make the highly
personal choice whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Akron, 462 U.S. at 420 n.l.
9 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3056 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)).
10 Id. at 3057.
"1 See id. at 3056-57.
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The court decisions following Roe have involved little more than
common sense application of constitutional principles that the Web-
ster plurality did not dispute. Roe simply held that an individual's
fundamental liberty "to bear or beget a child" extended to a right to
abortion, and identified two governmental interests that, if compel-
ling, might limit the right: the protection of a woman's own health,
and an interest in a developing fetus.
Any review of post-Roe litigation would show that the decision
has been as or more "workable" than most legal distinctions in spite
of efforts by hostile state and local governments to pass laws and
ordinances deliberately "close to the line of permissibility." Surely
the plurality does not mean to suggest that dissatisfied groups can
force the Court to abandon a constitutional principle simply by pass-
ing laws at the margin of its application, thereby creating an "intri-
cate web of regulation." Judging a constitutional principle by the
close calls it creates is not sound jurisprudence. The mere fact that
several members of the Supreme Court do not agree with previous
decisions of the Court does not make them "unworkable."
' 12
B. The Unsound In Principle Assertion
The plurality's claim that Roe is unsound in principle is equally
conclusory. The plurality asserted that because "key elements of the
Roe framework are not found in the text of the Constitution," Roe is
"hardly consistent with the notion of a Constitution cast in general
terms."'" This assertion is profoundly puzzling: there is no area of
Constitutional law in which the key doctrinal elements come from
"the text of the Constitution. '"14
12 Abortion law is a far cry from the complete disorder that several Justices
recognized only days before the Webster opinion in the term's RICO case, H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989). In RICO law, the matrix of
indefinite terms and phrases have led to near complete inability of the lower courts,
over a two-decade period, to maintain any boundaries for its use. The problems led
Justice Scalia, speaking for three other justices, to declare its main definitional test no
more helpful to lower courts than the statement "life is a fountain." Id. at 2907. No
one could make the same case against the workability of Roe. See also Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 523 (1985) (discussing severe
complexity, confusion, and unworkability of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976)).
13 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3056.
14 For example, the first amendment provides only the foundation for rules that
currently require judicial determination of whether a regulation is "content-based,"
"content-neutral," or "viewpoint-neutral." See, e.g, Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
461 (1980) (holding unconstitutional a statue which accorded "preferential
treatment to the expression of views on one particular subject"); Police Dep't v.
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The plurality also concluded that there is a problem with Roe's
discussion of the state's interest in the fetus, but did so in a most
cursory way. The Webster plurality merely wrote: "We do not see why
the state's interest in protecting potential human life should come
into existence only at the point of viability, and that there should
therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but
prohibiting it before viability."' 5
Without responding to either of Roe's central propositions,' 6 or
otherwise addressing Roe's constitutional principles, the plurality
attacked a version of the "rigid trimester framework" that bore little
resemblance to the actual case law. The plurality mentioned the sen-
sible distinctions between permissible (because medically sound) and
impermissible (because medically unnecessary) abortion regulations,
and abruptly announced: "We do not think that these distinctions
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[T]he First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content." (citations omitted)); see also G. GUNTHER, CONSITruTiONAL
LAW 1164 n.2 (11th ed. 1985) (reviewing academic literature concerning these
distinctions). These sub-questions and ambiguities include whether a "public
forum" or a "limited public forum" has been created, see, e.g., Hazelwood School
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 569 (1988) (rejecting the claim that a high school
newspaper is a public forum); whether an individual suing for libel is a "public
official," a "public figure," or a "public figure for certain purposes," see, e.g.,
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133-36 (1979) (holding that a recipient of
federal research money is not a public figure); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,
452-55 (1976) (holding that a person involved in a public controversy is not
necessarily a public figure); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974)
(permitting states to set liability standards where the plaintiff is a private individual);
and whether a publication is "obscene" or (merely) "indecent," see, e.g., Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2834 (1989) (holding
unconstitutional that portion of a statute that restricted adult access to telephone
messages which were indecent, but not obscene). Moreover, these points cover only
a fraction of the "framework" that creates the "intricate regulatory web" of first
amendment jurisprudence.
15 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057. Roe's "viability line" simply formally'recognized
an idea that many find intuitively plausible: a state's interest in fetal life becomes
more important as the fertilized ova develops from a microscopic entity to a being
that is in most respects a human infant. The difficult task for the Roe Court was to
decide when the interest became sufficiently compelling to justify such an
extraordinary imposition of the state's will on a pregnant woman.
Because there is no simple, logical deduction from a constitutional principle that
produces the viability point, the Roe decision reflected an accommodation, based on
the Court's best judgment, of the woman's fundamental liberty interest and arguably
important state interests. Every area of constitutional law necessarily requires
evaluating governmental and individual liberty interests, and exercising judgment
and discretion to balance them.
16 Roe held that women have a fundamentally important liberty to choose
whether to give birth, and that, before viability, there is no clearly established
overriding state interest.
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are of any constitutional import in view of our abandonment of the
trimester framework."
17
Other than alleging the framework's "complexity" and citing the
fact that it is not explicit in the Constitution's text, the plurality gave
no reason for "abandoning" it. Nor did they clearly explain what
abandoning the "trimester framework" means. Will the Court now
allow legislatures, under the guise of "health," to design and pass
illicit regulations that force a woman to continue a pregnancy, even
though the restrictions have no basis in sound medical practice?
Abandoning the "trimester framework," in itself, does not jus-
tify sustaining a state statute which burdens, for no good medical
reason, a fundamental liberty. The Court asserts that "the State's
interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling before
viability," without completely justifying the state's asserted interest
as compelling at any point.
The plurality thus rejected Roe's accommodation without analy-
sis and offered no suggestion for a better one. As a result, the plural-
ity's criticism of the "viability line" is as consistent with protecting a
woman's decision to choose abortion throughout pregnancy as it is
with eliminating abortion choice entirely. In a future term, if and
when the plurality gains the vote of an additional Justice, the Court
may simply treat Roe as a "derelict on the waters of the law,"' 8 a
decision so eroded by Webster that a future Court will, at that point,
find it unnecessary either to explain what was wrong with Roe, or to
reconcile its overruling of Roe with its retention of other fundamental
liberty cases. Respect for prior decisions should lead the Court to
offer a meaningful argument to establish the error of a constitutional
right to abortion before abandoning it. If the Court overrules Roe, it
should at least provide a decent burial.
II. RECONSIDERING ROE v. WADE: THE LIBERTY INTEREST IN
DECIDING WHETHER TO BEAR A CHILD
1 9
For a Court set on honestly reconsidering Roe v. Wade, there
17 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057 n.15.
18 Lambert v. California, 335 U.S. 225, 232 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
19 Some of the material drafted by the authors for this section subsequently
appeared in a brief that Professor Dellinger filed as counsel of record for twenty-six
Members of the United States Senate and 110 Members of the United States House
of Representatives as Amicus Curiae in support of the appellees in Turnock v.
Ragsdale, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3859 (U.S. July 3,
1989) (No. 88-790), the Illinois abortion case which was settled prior to oral
argument before the United States Supreme Court.
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appear to be three basic paths. The first is to conclude that the
underlying source of the abortion right-that there is a fundamental
right to procreative liberty and privacy-is an illegitimate interpreta-
tion of the Constitution. The second is to conclude that a woman's
right to choose an abortion can be distinguished from, and should
no longer be considered as part of, the established fundamental lib-
erty to bear or beget a child. Finally, the Court could conclude that
even though women have a fundamental constitutional liberty inter-
est in choosing abortion, a state may nonetheless override the right
by asserting a compelling interest in all fetal life.
.The Court could overrule Roe by holding that the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause did not provide any substantive pro-
tection for fundamental privacy rights. Whatever the ultimate merit
of this argument, it is principled. It would, of course, have been pos-
sible to give a narrow reading to the fourteenth amendment, a read-
ing that would have excluded any substantive limits on the legislative
capacity of the states other than those specified elsewhere in the
Constitution. The courts might have concluded, in David Currie's
brisk words, "that 'process' means procedure, that 'liberty' means
freedom from imprisonment, and that 'due process of law' means
according to the law of the land."20
Such a limited reading, however, has not been the course of con-
stitutional law in this century. It does not appear that the Court is
prepared to overrule the now substantial line of cases holding that
the fourteenth amendment protects important non-textual liberty
interests from hostile state legislation.
2 1
Those traveling down the second road bear the significant bur-
den of establishing a principled means for distinguishing Roe from
six decades of fundamental liberty and privacy cases. Former Solici-
20 D. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century
(1888-1986) (forthcoming).
21 Even Justice White has explicitly recognized the fact that such liberties are
now substantively protected by the fourteenth amendment against state
infringement. Writing for the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), he
acknowledged that:
It is true that despite the language of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, which appears to focus only on the
processes by which life, liberty, or property is taken, the cases are legion in
which those Clauses have been interpreted to have substantive content, subsuming
rights that to a great extent are immune from federal or state regulation
or proscription. Among such cases are those recognizing rights that have
little or no textual support in the constitutional language. Meyer, Prince,
and Pierce fall in this category, as do privacy cases from Griswold to Carey.
Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
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tor General Charles Fried, representing the United States as amicus
curiae in Webster, explicitly argued that the relevant earlier cases
could be distinguished and should not be overruled. He began his
submission with the assurance that, "[W]e are not asking this Court
to unravel the fabric of unenumerated and privacy rights which this
court has woven in cases like Meyer and Pierce and Moore and Griswold.
Rather, we are asking the Court to pull this one thread."
22
Retaining "the fabric of unenumerated and privacy rights"
makes it difficult to extract abortion from the list of protected inter-
ests. One approach is to argue, as ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice White have, that the Constitution's text "obviously contains no
references to abortion, nor indeed, to pregnancy or reproduction
generally; and it is highly doubtful that the authors of any of the pro-
visions of the Constitution believed that they were giving protection
to abortion."23 The absence of any express constitutional mention
of "abortion," though, cannot be dispositive of this issue.24 The
framers of the fourteenth amendment chose not to make a list of
protected "liberties," but included instead a general principle that
individuals should be free of unwarranted state interference.
Accepting the "no [textual] reference" argument would not leave
any fundamental rights case standing.
A less sweeping, but still broad, argument is that the abortion
right is not fundamental because, at "the most specific level," abor-
tion itself, it does not fit within a historical tradition of protection.
Such an attack misconstrues the proper role of historical tradition in
fundamental rights interpretation. The goal of constitutional juris-
prudence cannot be to inquire whether the narrowest or most spe-
cific aspect of an activity in question has historical support. The task,
rather, is to identify the historical values underlying the constitu-
tional principle at stake and to inquire whether the current activity
must be protected to realize those values.
22 Transcript of Oral Argument Before Court in Abortion Case, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27,
1989, at B12, col. 5 [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]. Fried's opening
statement was widely quoted, as was the rejoinder from counsel for the appellees,
Frank Susman: "It has always been my personal experience that when I pull a thread,
my sleeve falls off." Id. at B13, col. 1.
23 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 789 (1986).
24 Similarly, the absence of explicit text would not preclude a successful
constitutional challenge to governmentally compelled abortions. See generally P.
DIAMOND, THE SUPREME COURT ANDJUDICIAL CHOICE (1988) (arguing that there is no
escaping judicial choice where broad provisions of the fourteenth amendment
authorize a range of choices).
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The framers said nothing specific about hysterectomies and did
not even contemplate the issue when drafting the fourteenth amend-
ment, but concentrating on their opinion of reproductive surgery
would be inappropriate when assessing a statute that unjustly com-
pelled unnecessary hysterectomies or prohibited necessary hyster-
ectomies. A court that invalidated such a law would not be "creating
a new constitutional right to hysterectomy-choice," but merely
applying the established constitutional rule that deeply intrusive laws
restricting liberty must be justified by a compelling governmental
reason.
Arguing that a historical tradition of protection for a liberty
must be found at the "most specific level" for fourteenth amendment
protection is flatly contrary to decisions like Loving v. Virginia.25
Before Loving, there had unquestionably been a long and intensely
emotional tradition of attacking interracial marriage. The Court,
though, applied more general constitutional principles, racial equal-
ity and the fundamental right to marry, and found anti-miscegena-
tion laws both a violation of the equal protection clause and a
violation of the due process clause.
When Congress passed the fourteenth amendment, the country
accepted segregative laws because of deeply rooted prejudice toward
blacks. Similarly, the right to control one's reproductive capacity
may not have appeared to be liberty-denying by generations that
maintained archaic stereotypes about women's roles. In both cases,
an evolving understanding of the general value-the equality neces-
sary for meaningful liberty-made it clear that the more specific
activity had to be a protected element of the more general funda-
mental interest at stake.
26
25 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
26 In Michael H. & Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989), a case
involving the visitation rights of the natural father where the mother was married to
another man, the Justices' dialogue suggested scant support forJustice Scalia's "most
specific level" test for determining the contours of fundamental rights. In a lengthy
footnote, Justice Scalia set out the case for establishing what is fundamental by
"refer[ring] to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified." Id. at 2344 n.6. He went
on to say that only where "there was no societal tradition, either way, regarding" the
most specific tradition could one "consult, and (if possible) reason" at a more
general level. Id. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined this footnote.
Justice O'Connor andJustice Kennedy, whilejoining the rest of Scalia's opinion,
specifically dissented from this footnote, stating that they found this mode "of
identifying liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment... somewhat inconsistent with ... past decisions" such as Griswold and
Eisenstadt. See id. at 2346 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Furthermore, O'Connor
recognized that "[o]n occasion the Court has characterized relevant traditions
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If the "narrow tradition" and "textual reference" arguments fail
to distinguish the liberty interest in abortion from other fundamental
ones, how can one make the case that the Court could withdraw the
abortion right while keeping intact six decades of cases supporting a
fundamental liberty interest in vital areas of privacy?
Since the Court is not prepared to abandon cases such as Meyer
v. Nebraska,2 7 Skinner v. Oklahoma,28 Griswold v. Connecticut,2 9 Loving v.
Virginia,30 Eisenstadt v. Baird,3 3 and Moore v. City of East Cleveland,3 2 the
burden is on those who would suggest that a woman's personal deci-
sion to terminate a pregnancy is not a fundamentally important lib-
erty of the same magnitude as the interests involved in those cases.
33
Restrictive state abortion laws require women, and only women, to
endure government-mandated physical intrusions significantly more
substantial than those the Court has held to violate the constitutional
protecting asserted rights at levels of generality that might not be 'the most specific
level' available." Id. Justice O'Connor cited not only the due process clause portions
of Loving but also the unanimous 1987 ruling by the Court in Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 96 (1987), with no historical analysis, that prisoners have a right to marry, as
well as a page from Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961),
which included the following passages:
Each new claim of Constitutional protection must be considered
against a background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been
rationally perceived and historically developed. Though we exercise
limited and sharply restrained judgment, yet there is no "mechanical
yardstick," no "mechanical answer." The decision of an apparently novel
claim must depend on grounds which follow closely on well-accepted
principles and criteria. The new decision must take "its place in relation
to what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to come."
Id. 367 U.S. at 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)).
27 262 U.S. 390, 400, 403 (1923) (overruling a state statute forbidding teaching
in any language other than English and teaching foreign languages).
28 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (recognizing marriage and procreation as "fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race" and striking down a state statute
providing for involuntary sterilization of "habitual criminals").
29 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (striking down a state statute forbidding the use
of contraceptives by married couples).
30 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down a state anti-miscegenation statute).
31 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972) (striking down a state statute forbidding the
distribution of contraceptives to any unmarried person).
32 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion) (striking down an ordinance limiting
the occupancy of a dwelling to members of a single family).
33 Phillip Heymann and Douglas Barzelay first proposed the, argument that a
substantial line of Supreme Court fourteenth amendment decisions prior to Roe
created at least the presumption of a fundamental liberty interest in terminating a
pregnancy. See Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its
Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765 (1973) (responding to Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof" A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920 (1973)).
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principle of bodily integrity.34 By imposing mandatory childbearing,
the government itself creates significant risk of physical harm.35
Abortion laws also give the state control over a woman's basic
choices about reproduction and family planning,36 a situation incom-
patible with a meaningful concept of fundamental "liberty."
Because of its "total effect on the life and future of the one
enjoined,"Jed Rubenfeld argued recently, "[i]t is no exaggeration to
say that mandatory childbearing is a totalitarian intervention into a
woman's life.",
37
If Griswold is to remain good law, how can one fail to conclude
that women have at least a presumptive fundamental liberty interest
in deciding to terminate a pregnancy? The Webster opinions uphold-
ing the Missouri law virtually ignored this critical issue despite its
significant place in the oral arguments. The Solicitor General's Brief
in Webster argued that the right to choose an abortion is "inherently
different" from other closely related areas of privacy because it
34 Cf Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). Here, the state sought to compel
surgical removal of a bullet from beneath the skin of a murder suspect, a procedure
the lower court concluded would pose "minimal" or "very low" risk. See Lee v.
Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 900 (4th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court held that "[a]
compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body.., implicates expectations of
privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even
if likely to produce evidence of a crime." Winston, 470 U.S. at 759.
35 It has not been fashionable to emphasize the extent to which Roe was a case
concerning a person's right to decide among medical treatment options, but there
are substantial health and medical risks for women compelled by law to forgo an
abortion procedure. All pregnancies present a significant health risk, but women are
willing to assume it when they desire to have a child. When the government imposes
the risk, though, it creates an extraordinary imposition.
When the fetus is younger than eight weeks old, abortion is more than twenty
times safer than childbirth. The American Medical Association and other health
groups argued in Webster that "the health effects of pregnancy and abortion, by
themselves, should be sufficient to support the holding in Roe that the woman's
choice should be constitutionally protected." Brief Amici Curiae of the American
Medical Association, et. al., in Support of Appellees at 28, Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
36 See R. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE 5 (1984):
A woman's right to decide on abortion [and, it follows, on all childbearing
issues] when her health and her sexual self-determination are at stake is
"nearly allied to her right to be."
Reproduction affects women as women; it transcends class divisions
and penetrates everything - work, political and community involvements,
sexuality, creativity, dreams.
Id. (footnote omitted).
37 Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 791 (1989); see L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-10, at 1352-55 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing
why abortion laws cause enormous and unprecedented intrusions on privacy).
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"involves the purposeful termination of potential life."" s Whatever
the merits of this argument, it is not an argument about whether
there is a fundamental right involved, but about whether the state's
asserted interest in protecting human life should constrain or over-
ride that right. It is difficult to justify concluding that there is a fun-
damental liberty interest in purchasing a condom, but no
constitutional interest of similar magnitude in resisting government
compulsion to bear a child.
Moreover, how would the plurality draw the "sound in princi-
ple" and "workable in practice" lines it seeks to impose in light of
the fact that important methods of birth control operate as abor-
tifacients of fertilized ova?39 Would it be principled and workable
for the Supreme Court to announce a fundamental right to bear a
child that does not include the right to terminate a pregnancy, but
includes the right to use a condom or a diaphragm, and possibly
does not include the right to use an IUD or a morning after pill?
The United States, in its Webster amicus brief and in the oral
argument of former Solicitor General Fried, argued that the Court
could retain Griswold even if it overturned Roe. Squinting at Griswold,
the United States noted a reference there to the possibility of "police
searches of marital bedrooms for the tell-tale signs of the use of con-
traceptives," and suggested that Griswold could be read as a narrow
fourth amendment search and seizure case.4" This reading would
reduce the case to a largely inconsequential decision.
If Griswold only protects couples from police searches of marital
bedrooms, states would be free to criminalize all manufacture, sale,
and distribution of every kind of birth control device. National,
state, and local governments would be free to deny American citi-
zens access to birth control, as long as the government enforced its
ban by means other than searching marital bedrooms.
4 1
38 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 14,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (quoting Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980)).
39 See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3056; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at
B13, col. 2.
40 Brief for the United States as- Amicus Curiae, supra note 38, at 12 n.9; see also
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at BI3, col. I (quoting Mr. Fried on the
constitutional foundations of Griswold).
41 This limited reading would obviously require the overruling of Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977),
cases protecting the sale and distribution of contraceptives. It is not the case that
exercising the contraception right is necessarily more "private" than the exercise of
abortion choice. Under Missouri's definition of abortion, full enforcement of a ban
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The case for viewing the abortion right as fundamental is per-
haps most powerful after considering that if the choice is anything
less than fundamental, even simply a liberty interest, states would
need only a minimal justification to require women to undergo abor-
tions. This issue appeared at oral argument, but the Webster opinions
upholding the abortion restrictions ignored it.42
Former Solicitor General Fried argued in Webster that even if it
held that abortion choice is not a fundamental liberty, the Court
could still strike down a compulsory abortion law as an unconstitu-
tional seizure. The state would be "violently taking hands on, laying
hands on a woman and submitting her to an operation ....""
Fried's attempt to distinguish between forcing an abortion and forc-
ing childbirth, a far more painful and dangerous procedure than first
trimester abortion, is wholly inadequate. Fried's argument also fails
to recognize that in spite of Roe's declaration that the a woman's
choice is fundamental, lower court judges have allowed states to vio-
lently lay hands on a woman by requiring some women to undergo
forced cesarean section operations.44
on all abortions would involve the most intrusive searches conceivable for evidence
of use of pills and intrauterine devices that function as abortifacients.
42 This issue of compelled abortions is by no means hypothetical. The New
York Times reported this year that: "[s]even present and former New York City
correction officers contended . . .that the Correction Department regularly told
pregnant officers to have abortions or resign." See N.Y. Times, May 24, 1989 at B3,
col. 1; see also Correction Officials Fined Over Abortions, N.Y. Times, October 4, 1989, at
B2, col. 6 ("A senior official of New York City's Department of Corrections has
resigned and four others have been penalized in an investigation into charges that
the department has told pregnant correction officers to have abortions or resign.").
Moreover, there are a number of contemporary circumstances where state or local
governments might seek to force abortions: pregnancies likely to result in the birth of
AIDS babies; inmate pregnancies; pregnancies of the mentally retarded; pregnancies
of women in military or other security jobs.
43 The entire exchange at oral argument proceeded as follows:
Justice O'Connor: Do you think that the state has a right to, if in a future
century we had a serious overpopulation problem, has a right to require
women to have abortions after so many children?
Mr. Fried: I surely do not. That would be quite a different matter.
Justice O'Connor: What do you rest that on?
Mr. Fried: Because unlike abortion, which involves the purposeful
termination of future life, that would involve not preventing an operation
but violently taking hands on, laying hands on a woman and submitting
her to an operation and a whole constellation -
Justice O'Connor: And you would rest that on substantive due process
protection?
Mr. Fried: Absolutely.
Transcript of OralArgument, supra note 22, at B14, col. 5.
44 See Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, Court-Ordered Obstretical Interventions, 316 N.
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Obviously, it would not be necessary to physically seize a woman
to enforce a compulsory abortion law. The state could punish failure
to undergo an abortion by after-the-fact civil or criminal fines, jail
sentences, or other sanctions, including the punitive withholding of
government benefits. In each case, the government would override a
woman's decision about how to treat her pregnancy. It is simply
unclear where the strong "substantive due process protection" Fried
would invoke to prevent forced abortions would find its source if the
Court overturned Roe and accepted the United States' exceedingly
narrow reading of virtually every Supreme Court decision concern-
ing fundamental liberties.45
Attempting to improve on Fried's answer to the compelled abor-
tion question, Kenneth Starr, the new'Solicitor General, revisited the
issue in his brief in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 46 an abortion case the Court
will hear in the 1989 Term. The new answer not only fails to distin-
guish compelled abortion adequately, it makes a startling concession
that powerfully supports Roe's basic holding. .
After arguing that "it cannot reasonably be said that the right to
abortion is fundamental[,] ''4 7 the Solicitor General proceeded none-
theless to argue that there is a fundamental liberty interest in being
free from compelled abortion. He wrote: "By contrast, a state law
mandating abortions would present a starkly different question....
Our nation's history and traditions establish that a competent adult
may generally refuse unwanted medical intrusion. This right would,
we believe, extend to an unwanted abortion."-48 Conceding that the
"nation's history and traditions establish" a fundamental liberty
interest in being free from "unwanted medical intrusion" is surely
correct, and doing so just as surely supports a fundamental interest
in terminating a pregnancy. A competent adult's decision to have an
abortion in the early weeks is clearly a decision to "refuse unwanted
medical intrusion." Compelled childbirth is a major medical event
ENG.J. MED. 1192 (1987) (discussing ten states where courts have ordered women to
admit to cesarean sections).
45 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 38, at 12 nn.7-9.
In three remarkable footnotes, the Solicitor General's brief argues that most of the
major cases involving fourteenth amendment liberty are "explicable in terms of some
other constitutional command beyond the generalized interest in 'liberty' secured by
the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 12.
46 Nos. 88-1125, 88-1309.
47 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents in No.
88-1125, Hodgson v. Minnesota, and Supporting Cross-Petitioners in No. 88-1309,
Minnesota v. Hodgson at 14.
48 Id. at 14 n.7.
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and far more dangerous than aborting an early pregnancy. More-
over, a quarter of all pregnancies end with Cesarean section, a major
medical procedure.49 By denying women the right to elect early,
medically simple abortion, and thereby forcing pregnant women to
undergo childbirth, the United States government necessarily vio-
lates the principle that it concedes "[o]ur Nation's history and tradi-
tion" establishes: "competent adult[s] may generally refuse
unwanted medical intrusion."
In the end, the Webster plurality neither distinguished freedom
from state-compelled childbirth from the other fundamental rights,
nor indicated a willingness to abandon the substantive protection of
comparable liberties. Chief Justice Rehnquist's entire defense of the
plurality's "failure to join in a 'great issues' debate as to whether the
Constitution includes as 'unenumerated' general right to privacy as
recognized in cases such as Griswold . . . and Roe" was simply to
respond:
But Griswold v. Connecticut, unlike Roe, did not purport to adopt a
whole framework, complete with detailed rules and distinctions, to
govern the cases in which the asserted liberty interest would apply.
As such, it was far different from the opinion, if not the holding, of
Roe v. Wade, which sought to establish a constitutional framework
for judging state regulation of abortion during the entire term of
pregnancy.
5 0
The plurality opinion thus ends where it began: hiding, from the
central issues behind an irrelevant criticism of "frameworks," and
never once suggesting why freedom from extraordinary state inter-
vention into a woman's life should no longer be considered a funda-
mental constitutional liberty.
III. JUSTICE O'CONNOR: BURDENS ON LIBERTY
THAT ARE NOT "UNDUE"
Even if the Court were to continue to hold that women have a
fundamental liberty interest in deciding to terminate a pregnancy,
many women could still be effectively deprived of the right to exer-
cise their choice by the Court imposing an overly restrictive view of
how burdensome state restrictions must be before they constitute an
infringement of that liberty interest.5 Justice O'Connor argued in
49 See Placet & Taffel, Recent Patterns in Caesarean Delivery in the United States, 15
OBSET. GYNEC. CLIN., N.A. 607 (1988).
50 See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057-58.
51 In footnote 16 of his amicus brief, the Solicitor General takes the novel
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Akron and Thornburgh that many restrictions on abortion may not bur-
den women's choice of abortion sufficiently to trigger serious consti-
tutional scrutiny. The notion that heightened governmental
justification for a law is required only when the law burdens a funda-
mental right to some minimum degree is hardly controversial. What
is troublesome, however, is Justice O'Connor's stringent interpreta-
tion, expressed in her earlier opinions, 52 as to what constitutes an
"undue burden." Defining undue burden as an "absolute obstacle
or severe limitation on the abortion right,",5 3 Justice O'Connor has
displayed an apparent willingness to sustain very significant limita-
tions on access to abortion under this standard.54
position that the undue burden test can justify even criminalizing all abortions. The
Solicitor General reaches this conclusion by first asserting that the liberty interest
that must not be burdened is not the right to abortion, but the right to bear or beget
a child. He then concludes that outlawing all abortions-except those by forcible
rape or incest-would not deny women a meaningful opportunity to avoid pregnancy
as long as they had "options" such as "abstinence and contraception" and
presumably sterilization.
Even if one attempts arguendo that the proper analysis should focus on a
"meaningful opportunity to avoid an unwanted pregnancy," the Solicitor General's
argument falls short. This argument is based on the notion that as long as a woman's
pregnancy is not due to rape or incest, she could have avoided it and thus does not
need a right to choose abortion to have a meaningful right to decide whether to bear
a child. One of the two "options" presented to secure this right is the absence of
legal abortions, is contraception. Yet contraception is far from foolproof and some
women have health risks that prevent them from using the most effective methods.
Contraceptive failure, in fact, is so common that the majority of women who have
abortions did use contraception. Thus, as long as contraceptive failure is one of the
major causes of unwanted pregnancies, the only truly meaningful option under the
Solicitor General's undue burden analysis is either sterilization of abstinence during
the entire of the four decades of a woman's fertile life in which she does not desire to
give birth.
52 Justice O'Connor's Webster opinion was most notable for what it did not say.
The tone of her opinion was significantly less hostile to Roe than any of her previous
opinions. While she did not abandon her previous position that all state restrictions
on abortion except those that impose an "undue burden" on a woman's choice are
constitutionally permissible, it appears in Webster in a more muted guise. For an
analysis of her previous positions, see Sperling, Justice in the Middle, THE ATLANTIc,
March 1988, at 26-33.
53 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Akron, 462
U.S. at 464). In Akron, while explaining the difference between an undue burden and
those that simply "'inhibit' abortion to some degree," Akron, 462 U.S. at 464
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), Justice O'Connor cites in the text Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 534, 545 (1963), because it shows that "even in the first
amendment context" a fundamental right must be "infringed substantially." Yet, the
Gibson opinion itself later describes the standard as one whose regulations
"substantially intrude upon and severely curtail or inhibit constitutionally protected
activities." Gibson, 372 U.S. at 555 (emphasis added).
154 Besides being willing to uphold the regulations in Webster, O'Connor has
suggested that valid state restrictions could include a mandatory twenty-four hour
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Because this undue burden standard applies rational relation-
ship review to the state interest unless the challenging party meets a
certain threshold burden, the doctrine becomes less sound as the
threshold gets higher. The Court should at least ensure that when a
statute significantly implicates a fundamental right, the proffered
governmental interest is clearly both legitimate and related to the
state's interests. Thus, when examining a health regulation that
implicates a fundamental right, the Court should at least be willing
to look closely at whether or not that health regulation is medically
necessary and promotes the asserted state interest.
A. Practical and Cumulative Effects
If the Court were to place such a strong emphasis on the exact
degree such restrictions burden individual women, the Court bears a
strong responsibility to avoid purely theoretical judgments and
instead to make a practical inquiry about whether abortion regula-
tions operate, alone or together, as a significant burden. Justice
O'Connor's Akron and Thornburgh opinions suggest that particular
findings or evidence could be relevant to determining when there is
an undue burden. Her Akron dissent noted:
there [was] no evidence in this case to show that the two Akron hospi-
tals that performed second-trimester abortions denied an abortion
to any woman, or that they would not permit abortion by the D&E
procedure. . . . In addition there was no evidence presented that
other hospitals in nearby areas did not provide second-trimester
abortions.
55
In Thornburgh, O'Connor focused much of her dissent on the
Court's willingness to find, by ruling before a trial on the merits:
[t]hat each of the challenged provisions [was] facially unconstitu-
tional as a matter of law, and that no conceivable facts ... could
alter this result . . . [T]he mere possibility that some women
waiting period; a requirement that all abortions be performed in fully accredited
hospitals; a hospital-committee approval requirement; and a requirement that two
doctors concur in the abortion decision. Concerning a requirement in Thornburgh
that there be a required description of fetal characteristics at two-week intervals,
O'Connor does concede that "[i]f the materials were sufficiently inflammatory and
inaccurate the fact that the woman must ask to see them would not necessarily
preclude finding an undue burden, but there is no indication that this is true of the
description of fetal characteristics that statute contemplates." Id. at 831 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
55 Akron, 462 U.S. at 466 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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[would] be less likely to choose to have an abortion by virtue of the
presence of a particular state regulation suffice[d] to invalidate it.
5 6
Because O'Connor's Akron and Thornburgh opinions were dis-
sents, she was able to consider each regulation piecemeal and
explain why she felt that each particular regulation by itself did not
constitute an undue burden. Yet, the ultimate question for any
reviewing court is not simply a specific regulation's impact, but
rather the degree of burden that the entire regime of abortion regu-
lations places on a woman. Courts will thus have to assess how a
given regulation incrementally adds to the cumulative burden on the
fundamental right. Any other method would allow a state to pile on
"reasonable regulation" after "reasonable regulation" until a
woman seeking an abortion first had to conquer a multi-faceted
obstacle course.
5 7
If Justice O'Connor's undue burden test is to become law,
courts should assess the likely impact a challenged regulation will
have in light of the context, community, and particular burdens that
all women in the relevant state will face.
5 8
56 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 829 (O'Connor,J., dissenting). Furthermore, in Bates
v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), one of the three non-abortion
fundamental right cases Justice O'Connor cited affirmatively in her undue burden
discussion, the Court did not base its finding of an undue burden on anything
approaching a formal prohibition on associational rights, but on the basis of how a
neutral law, in that case an occupation tax requiring membership disclosure, would
operate effectively to deny or "discourage" the exercise of those rights in light of the
context, community, expected private behavior and "fear of community hostility and
economic reprisal that would follow public disclosure of the membership lists ..
Id. at 524.
57 Cf Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) ("[C]umulative effect"
of small license tax could crush religious practice when "exacted town by town").
58 Thejudicial task in assessing the degree of burden would be especially crucial
when determining whether a decrease in availability constitutes an undue burden.
When deciding whether access to abortion services has been substantially infringed,
courts will have to carefully assess the likely and foreseeable impact that regulations
will have on the particular communities affected. The fact that others may at some
point replace suppliers driven out by new or newly enforced regulations, thus
restoring some of the lost availability, is speculative and of little consequence to
those women whose rights are unduly burdened during the lag time before new
providers fill gaps in services created by the regulations. In Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 689 (1977), on a page that O'Connor cites reprovingly in
her Akron undue burden discussion, the Supreme Court recognized that "limiting...
distribution" can constitute an undue burden. The Court explained:
[t]he burden is, of course, not as great as that under a total ban on
distribution. Nevertheless, the restriction of distribution channels to a
small fraction of the total number of possible retail outlets renders
contraceptive devices considerably less accessible to the public, reduces
the opportunity for privacy of selection and purchase and lessens the
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B. Absolute Deprivations
The Supreme Court has at times distinguished between relative
and absolute deprivation when determining whether it should apply
compelling governmental interest analysis. In San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,5 9 the Court suggested twice that strict scru-
tiny would be inapplicablewhere the disadvantage was of a "relative-
rather than absolute-nature."6 The Court noted a significant con-
stitutional difference between state action that somewhat burdens or
dilutes the effective exercise of fundamental rights and those that
lead to a complete denial to any of its citizens. In Rodriguez, there
was no danger that any student would be effectively denied an educa-
tion.6 1 With abortion, however, regulations that restrict access to
abortion effectively deny that right to some women: either a woman
is able to overcome the governmental barriers to abortion or she is
not. Where individual rights are at stake, the fact that such denials
may affect only a portion of the populace should not be decisive.
The Court's opinion in Maher v. Roe62 and Harris v. McCrae q 3 are
not to the contrary. There, the Court stressed that governmental
failure to extend governmental benefits is constitutional as long as
the government does not affirmatively place obstacles in women's
path. In Maher, the Court found that Connecticut's decision to use
Medicaid funding only for childbirth but not for abortion "place[d]
no obstacles - absolute or otherwise - in the pregnant woman's
path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires an abortion
suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision
to fund childbirth... it has imposed no restraint or obstacle that was
not already there.
' ' 4
Thus, the Court found that when the government does not
extend benefits necessary for a poor woman to have an abortion, the
relevant or proximate cause of her inability to end pregnancy is her
poverty. When, however, the government chooses to alter the cur-
possibility of price competition. Cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 503
(White, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 689 (citations omitted).
59 411 U.S. 1 (1972).
60 Id at 19; see also id. at 37-38.
61 In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), where this danger did exist-and was in
fact before the Court-the Court clearly provided some form of heightened scrutiny.
62 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
63 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
64 Maher, 432 U.S. at 474. See generally Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum:
Inalienable Rights and the Dilemma of Dependance, 99 HARv. L. REv. 330 (1985)
(questioning the obstacle/benefit distinction in abortion funding cases).
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rent landscape relating to abortion access and foreseeably denies a
woman the ability to have an abortion, then the government's affirm-
ative act is the cause of the effective denial. Thus, where the state
affirmatively acts in such a manner, the Court should find an undue
burden.
The fact that such logic could be carried to inappropriate
extremes should not blind the Court from making reasonable judg-
ments as to when an affirmative act is likely to prevent some subset of
the citizenry from effectively exercising its fundamental rights. As a
result, where a state acts, through an abortion-neutral or abortion-
specific regulation, and causes some women to "suffer[] [a] disadvan-
tage as a consequence of [the] decision," 6 5 the Court must be willing
to consider carefully the impact on all women-including those who
are most vulnerable-when judging whether a restriction constitutes
an undue burden on access to abortion.
Many commentators assume that "moderate" restrictions on
access to abortion-the sorts of restrictions that might be upheld
under an "undue burden" standard-would constitute no more than
"skirmishing around the edges"; "minor changes" that will not with-
draw "basic rights." 66 Waiting periods, informational requirements,
mandatory testing, excessive regulations of clinics, and the like, may
not appear to impose an "absolute obstacle" to the exercise of
choice for affluent women living in urban centers. But when such
restrictions are considered cumulatively, their impact on availability
may in fact constitute an absolute deprivation of the right to choose
for many women who are young or poor or living in rural areas.
A forty-eight hour waiting period, for example, may not be an
"undue burden" for affluent professional women, and a hospitaliza-
tion requirement may only serve to make her abortion more expen-
sive. But for an 18-year-old girl in the rural South, unmarried,
pregnant, hoping to finish school and build a decent life, who has
little or no access to transportation, a hospitalization requirement
can mean an abortion that will cost nearly one-thousand dollars and
involve a trip of hundreds of miles; a waiting period can mean two
long trips and an overnight stay in a strange and distant city. For
such a woman, the burden would be absolute. Likewise, while a
parental notification law may amount to only an embarrassment for
minors from the most loving families, for those who are among the
65 Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
66 For example, see As Pennsylvania Goes?, Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 1989, at A14, col.
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six million children in our country who are victims of domestic vio-
lence or sexual abuse, a notification requirement can be the func-
tional equivalent of an absolute obstacle to safe and legal health care
for one wishing to terminate a crisis pregnancy. In all these scena-
rios, the fact that these regulations will serve as an absolute obstacle
for a part of the female population is entirely foreseeable.
67
It would be difficult to justify a constitutional test that permitted
states to enact restrictions that wholly precluded choice for some
women merely because those restrictions would not constitute an
"undue burden" for other, more fortunate women. Such an
approach would simply draw a social and economic line across soci-
ety, above which women would be able to have safe and legal abor-
tions, and below which women would be returned to illegal and
dangerous alternatives.6' Restrictions that preclude the exercise of
procreative choice by even a small subset of women should be sus-
tained only if necessary to advance a governmental interest of com-
pelling importance.
V. RECONSIDERING ROE V. WAVE: THE COMPELLING STATE
INTEREST IN PROTECTING FETAL LIFE
Abortion presents a more difficult constitutional question than
contraception because the state can assert a wholly plausible compel-
ling governmental interest: protection of potential life from the
moment of conception. Merely asserting a plausible compelling gov-
ernmental interest is not in itself dispositive in fundamental liberty
cases, though. Where a fundamental individual liberty is clearly at
stake, a court must ascertain whether the statutory regime reflects
and actually advances the asserted overriding community value.
67 Cf Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 114 (1943) (noting that it was
foreseeable that license taxes "either separately or cumulatively . . . are likely to
restrict ... religious activities" of religious minority).
68 As former Justice Powell argued in 1983, "[i]t requires no great familiarity
with the cost and limited availability of such hospitals to appreciate that the effect of
[O'Connor's] views would be to drive the performance of many abortions back
underground free of effective regulations and often without the attendance of a
physician." Akron, 462 U.S. at 420 n.1. Certainly, the Court's finding in Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), that a $1.50 poll tax was an undue
burden, was not based on the notion that the fee would affect the electorate as a
whole. Rather, the Court recognized that the extra cost would foreclose some
people's ability to vote. As with the Court's abortion decisions, there is no
affirmative right to have the state provide the means to vote. At the same time,
though, where the state chooses to enact an obstacle that foreseeably denies some
citizens the effective exercise of their right, it must come forth with a compelling
governmental interest to justify its restriction.
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Making some constitutional liberties fundamental necessarily obli-
gates courts to insist that states provide more than a bare assertion
of an overriding public purpose.
The Webster plurality, however, assumes that a state's mere reci-
tation of a plausible compelling interest fully discharges the burden
of justification. Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, previ-
ously stated that "if a state legislature asserts an interest in protect-
ing fetal life, I can see no satisfactory basis for denying that it is
compelling."69 The Webster plurality added an equally undefended
assertion that "we do not see why the State's interest in protecting
potential human life should come into existence only at the point of
viability .. "70
The Webster plurality's unwillingness to give any serious scrutiny
to the states' mere assertion of a compelling governmental interest
sharply contrasts with the same Justices' approach to another of last
term's important cases. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,7 1 the
Court subjected the city's assertion of a compelling governmental
interest in eradicating prior racial discrimination to "searching judi-
cial inquiry" and "close examination of legislative purpose." 72 The
Croson Court demanded specific, objective, concrete evidence not
only to show the existence of a compelling governmental interest,
but also to show that the government had considered less constitu-
tionally problematic means to promote its interest, and that the
measures they adopted were actually narrowly tailored to meet the
stated objective.
In Croson, the Court reaffirmed its position that the government
has the burden to establish the existence of interests that would jus-
tify encroaching upon a fundamental constitutional value. The
Court added: "[T]he mere recitation of a benign, compensatory pur-
pose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry
into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme."
73
69 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 796 n.4 (1986).
70 Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057.
71 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). In Croson, the Court invalidated provisions of a
Richmond plan that required city contractors to subcontract at least 30% of the
dollar amount of each contract to one or more "Minority Business Enterprises." For
a discussion of other aspects of Croson, see Constitutional Scholars Statement on Affirmative
Action after City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711 (1989); Fried,
Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Response to the Scholars'
Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155 (1989).
72 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721.
73 Id. at 722 (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)).
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Any other conclusion would eviscerate decisions like Griswold v.
Connecticut."4 If the judiciary accepted mere legislative assertions
about values that trump individual liberties, Connecticut could rein-
troduce its contraception ban by declaring a fundamental interest in
the potential life of each sperm and ovum even prior to fertilization.
The state could conclude that all forms of contraception terminate
potential life, and are prohibitable.
There is an additional basis to expect searching judicial scrutiny
for abortion regulations: not bnly do these regulations implicate a
fundamental right, they also affect only women. In the context of
extending insurance benefits, the Court has stated that classifications
referring to pregnant people are not sex-based. Even if this dubious
notion was extended to abortion cases-where the issue is imposing
obstacles and not extending benefitsV5 -the Court has a serious obli-
gation to review closely the states' motivation in passing and enforc-
ing such laws. Where male-dominated legislatures pass laws
affecting only women, at a minimum, courts must ensure that these
kinds of laws do not reflect conscious or unconscious sex discrimina-'
tion. As the Supreme Court noted in Croson, "[a]bsent searching
judicial inquiry into the justification [for such classifications] there is
simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or
'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegiti-
mate notions ... ."76 It may be that legislatures passed restrictive
abortion legislation for the purpose of preserving the potential life of
every fetus from fertilization. Those who would overrule Roe, how-
ever, have never asked the restricting states to substantiate that
assertion.
77
74 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
75 In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), then Justice Rehnquist
distinguished between "merely refus[ing] to extend to women a benefit men cannot
and do not receive" and "impos[ing] on women a substantial burden that men need
not suffer." Id. at 142.
76 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721.
77 When only a discrete subset of the population will be adversely affected by a
law, moreover, its passage by the legislature does not necessarily reflect a settled
majoritarian consensus that the public value to be advanced would be worth
pursuing if all were potentially subject to the law's burdensome impact. As Guido
Calabresi commented in his recent Meiklejohn Lecture, "To say that a legislature can
order kidney or marrow donations is not to say that a bureaucrat can, or that a hasty
legislature can, or that such donations can be asked only of Jews, or blacks, or
women." G. Calabresi, Between Brennan and Bork (1989) (unpublished
manuscript).
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A. Evaluating the State's Asserted Interests
The most powerful justification a state could assert for partially
or completely overriding a woman's fundamental right is an interest
in protecting all potential human life. Yet, while states have been
willing to enforce their abortion laws to deny the most vulnerable
women access to safe and legal abortion, states have never main-
tained policies, statutes, or enforcement procedures that would dis-
play anything approaching a compelling interest in protecting all
potential human life.7"
States have never protected the potential life of all fertilized ova.
Sixty-two percent of fertilized ova spontaneously and naturally abort,
a figure that dwarfs the number of induced abortions.7 9 If the state
had an interest in protecting all fetal life that was weighty enough to
justify eviscerating a woman's entire liberty interest in abortion, one
would expect the state to treat the 62% figure as nothing short of an
epidemic or national health crisis. The lack of concern about the fact
that a majority of fertilized ova spontaneously abort suggests that the
state's interest must be something other than a compelling interest
in protecting all such life.
The lack of criminal penalties on pregnant women themselves
also defies any notion that states have exhibited a compelling interest
78 In 1983, Professor William Van Alstyne argued powerfully that the text,
history, and enforcement of Texas' statute in Roe provided "an extremely strong
reason for doubting the bonafides of the principle ("life-saving") defense" that Texas
offered. As Van Alstyne put it, "the essence of the Texas statute was that (1) it
effectively limited medically-safe abortions to reasonably well-to-do residents of
Texas on (2) a currently counterfactual predicate of medical procedures concerned
with women's safe treatment." Van Alstyne concluded that "[t]he constitutional
criminalization of woman's choice on such a foundation (of zygoted sanctity) was
radically unconvincing." Van Alstyne, The Fate of Constitutional Ipse Dixits, 33 J. OF
LEGAL EDUC. 712, 719 (1983).
79 See Edmonds, et. al., Early Embryonic Mortality in Women, 38 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 447, 451 (1982) ("[T]otal embryonic loss is very high, 62% of all detected
pregnancies terminating prior to 12 weeks."). The generally accepted finding is that
15% of clinically recognized pregnancies terminate in spontaneous abortions. See id. at
447. When this figure "is combined with the percentage of patients who fail to have a
successful pregnancy after a missed period, postimplantation embryo loss appears to
be almost four times the figure accepted for spontaneous abortion." Id. Much of this
embryo loss occurs before women are aware that they are pregnant. See also Cook,
Legal Abortion: Limits and Contributions to Human Life, in ABORTION: MEDICAL PROGRESS
AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS, CIBA FOUNDATION SyMPOSiUM 213 (1985). The natural
process of reproduction is one of oversupply. During embryonic development a
female has up to six million ova, each genetically unique. Hundreds will be ovulated.
Id. at 214. Each male produces billions of sperm. As Dr. Malcome Potts notes, "The
fact that not all fertilized eggs give rise to embryos seems to be ethically as well as
biologically significant." Id. at 223.
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in all potential life. The Texas law in Roe made it criminal for any
person to "procure" an abortion for a woman, except for the pur-
pose of saving her life."0 It was not a crime for a woman to obtain an
abortion. In a state with a true compelling interest in preventing all
terminations of potential life, such a criminal law scheme would be
bizarre if not irrational.
In addition, statutes restricting abortion often except pregnancy
caused by rape or incest. Such exceptions are, of course, under-
standable, but by making this exception, the state acknowledges that
there are some reasons that justify terminating a fertilized ova that
have nothing to do with the moral or physical qualities of the fetus,
but rather with the circumstances of the woman's pregnancy.8 1 We
do not suggest that laws prohibiting abortion become valid or invalid
as states add or drop exemptions.8 2 The statutory exceptions are
simply one aspect of the social regime of abortion regulation that
raises serious questions about the states' assertion that their laws rest
on a carefully considered compelling interest in protecting all fertil-
80 See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1191 (Vernon 1961).
81 The fact that the rape exception has nothing to do with the quality of the
fetus and its moral claims can be seen in the example of a woman who has been raped
and brutalized by her husband or lover, and seeks to terminate her pregnancy.
Under the theory of the rape exception, she is permitted to have an abortion if-but
only if-she can show that the pregnancy resulted from the rape rather than from an
earlier "voluntary" act of intercourse with him. Yet both her interest in terminating
the pregnancy and the moral claims of the fetus are unaffected by the resolution of
any inquiry into which act of intercourse produced the junction of his sperm and her
ovum. The actual pattern of abortion laws might be seen as evidence of illicit
motives or suggest that such laws were partially a product of conscious or
unconscious stereotypical notions about women's proper roles. In making an
exception for rape and incest, the state may perhaps reflect a less-than-fully-
conscious "good girl/bad girl" distinction: a small group of women who can
definitively demonstrate to government officials that they were not "at fault" in
becoming pregnant may have an abortion, while others may not.
82 It may be, in fact, that rape victims have an especially strong claim to a
constitutional abortion right. A statute that forbids abortion generally but makes an
exception for rape pregnancies, however, does not fully protect a rape victim's right
to abort. Such a statute provides far less protection than Roe. Under Roe, any rape
victim could choose to abort a pregnancy. With a "rape exception," victims would
not have that right, but only the quite different "right" to seek to prove that she was
"in fact" raped; often a difficult task. Proving rape, though, would only be the
beginning.
Under the theory of the rape exception, a woman would be entitled to an
abortion only if she could also prove that her pregnancy resulted from the rape and not
from some other act of sexual intercourse. The privacy sacrifice in such a situation
constitutes an additional argument against a statute that limits the permissible
grounds for an abortion. Those hostile to all abortions are likely to seek
appointment to committees that would decide these questions. In such a case, choice
could be replaced by cross-examination.
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ized ova. The point is simply that a statute that determines the legal-
ity of abortions based upon the woman's relative "blameworthiness"
in becoming pregnant is not easily justified by the assertion that
there is a compelling state interest in all potential life after
fertilization.
Most abortion laws also contained an exception for cases where
continuing the pregnancy threatened a woman's health. Yet, as
many anti-abortion activists argue, why would a state that had a com-
pelling interest in protecting all potential life choose in favor of the
mother in this instance?
Regardless of how legislatures wrote pre-Roe statutes, no state
ever enforced the laws in any consistent or coherent fashion. None
took any steps to prevent affluent women from leaving the state to
obtain abortions."s The pattern of exemptions and non-enforce-
ment that characterized abortion regulation before Roe and deter-
mined which women could obtain abortions created a regime of
manifest economic discrimination. Surely, knowing that the theoret-
ical claims made for the human life principle in practice affected only
women, and among them, only relatively poor and uneducated ones
influenced the Roe Court. The exception based on the pregnant
woman's mental health, for example; was often available in practice
only to those who could afford a private psychiatrist. As Dean Cala-
bresi has noted, "Compelled life saving is easier to enact (and for
that very reason constitutionally suspect) when disfavored groups
are forced to do the life saving.
' 8 4
The fact that no state consistently acted upon its professed
interest in protecting all fetal life suggests either that the interest was
something less than compelling, or that there was a different interest
altogether. In early right-to-privacy cases, the Supreme Court
clearly looked to the consistency with which the state enforced its
asserted interest as a significant factor in determining whether the
interest was truly compelling. 5 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 8 6 for example,
the Supreme Court specifically rejected Massachusetts' assertion that
its actual interest in prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives
was to discourage pre-marital sex. The Court noted: "[T]he Massa-
83 Five thousand American women had abortions in England alone in the year
before Roe was decided.
84 G. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrITUDES, AND THE LAW, 103 (1985).
85 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 505-06 (1965) (White, J.,
concurring).
86 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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chusetts statute is thus so riddled with exceptions that deterrence of
pre-marital sex cannot reasonably be regarded as its aim."87
Finally, there is the argument from history. Contrary to the
Solicitor General's Webster Brief, this country historically has not rec-
ognized moral concern for life from the moment of conceptipn as
compelling. The Solicitor General based its compelling governmen-
tal interest argument on the assumption that the critical question to
be decided was "what interests have been historically recognized as
compelling.""8 The United States rests its entire case for the exist-
ence of a compelling interest on an historical conclusion that cannot
be defended. After noting that state laws restricting abortion were
common when Congress adopted the fourteenth amendment, the
Brief offers a single sentence to substantiate its claim that "the his-
torical record" shows that protection of potential fetal life was con-
sidered compelling. With but one general citation to J. Mohr's
authoritative book on abortion, the Brief reads:
The tenor and contemporaneous understanding of the anti-abor-
tion laws enacted from the mid-Nineteenth Century up to the time
of the decision in Roe v. Wade leave little doubt that they were
directed not only at protecting maternal health, but also at what
was widely viewed as a moral evil comprehending the destruction
of actual or nascent human life.89
It is, generally agreed that Mohr's work is most authoritative on
the history of abortion and its regulation,90 but his research provides
little support for the proposition that state abortion laws show a his-
torical tradition of considering the need to protect all fetal life com-
pelling. Abortion was legal when the framers adopted the ninth
amendment and the rest of the Bill of Rights, and states passed early
laws affecting abortion to protect women from the severe danger
that accompanied surgical abortion during the nineteenth century. 9 1
Mohr further demonstrates that later abortion laws addressed factors
87 Id. at 449.
88 Brief for the United States at 16, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
89 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 38, at 13 (quotingJ.
MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA (1978)).
90 Both the Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Webster v.
Reproductive Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), and the Brief of 281 American
Historians as Amicus Curiae supporting Appellees, Webster v. Reproductive
Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), rely on Mohr's work. Mohr himself, however, was
one of the 281 historians who signed on to the latter brief opposing the historical
interpretation suggested by the Solicitor General in his amicus curiae brief.
91 SeeJ. MOHR, supra note 89, at 3-45.
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that are either now medically outmoded or recognized as discrimina-
tory: restrictive views about women's sexuality and proper role;
92
health concerns concerning any surgical procedure;93 nativist fears
about declining birthrates among white Protestant women who were
practicing birth control and having abortions at a time when immi-
grant populations were rising;94 and an effort by the medical profes-
sion to secure its hegemony over reproductive medical procedures
by preventing mid-wives who would induce abortion from
practicing.
95
The moral value of a fetus, while certainly important to some
92 Mohr demonstrates that the drive for abortion laws was primarily lead by
physicians and the newly created American Medical Association in the mid-to-late
1800s. See id. at 46-85. Yet the AMA's support for abortion laws seemed to have
been as much infected by sexism as was other institutions at the time, such as the
United States Supreme Court. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872)
(Bradley, J., concurring). In 1871, the AMA's Committee on Criminal Abortion
described women who have abortion in the following manner:
She becomes unmindful of the course marked out for her by Providence,
she overlooks the duties imposed on her by the marriage contract. She
yields to the pleasures - but shrinks from the pains and responsibilities
of maternity; and, destitute of all delicacy and refinement, resigns herself,
body and soul, into the hands of unscrupulous and wicked men. Let not
the husband of such a wife flatter himself that he possesses her affection.
Nor can she in turn ever merit even the respect of a virtuous husband.
She sinks into old age like a withered tree, stripped of its foliage; with the
stain of blood upon her soul, she dies without the hand of affection to
smooth her pillow.
Atlee & O'Donnell, Report of the Committee on Criminal Abortion, 22 TRANSACTIONS OF
AM. MED. ASS'N 241 (1871), quoted in C. SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT
236-37 (1985); see also Brief of 281 American Historians, supra note 90, at 17-19; L.
GORDON, WOMEN'S BODY, WOMEN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN
AMERICA 414-18 (1976); K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD
192-215 (1984); L. TRIBE, supra note 37, § 15-10, at 1355-56.
93 SeeJ. MOHR, supra note 89, at 22, 25-27; Brief of 281 American Historians,
supra note 90, at 12. Even where the fetus was recognized by law, it was only in
specific situations where the rights were contingent on a live birth. See generally Note,
The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy,
and Equal Protection, 95 YALE LJ. 599, 601 (1986) (authored by Dawn Johnsen)
(historically, "[tihe fetus was not given any rights independent of its mother; rather,
it was only after the fetus became a person at birth that it acquired legal rights as
separate entity").
94 "There can be little doubt that Protestant fears about not keeping up with the
reproductive rates of Catholic immigrants played a greater role in the drive for anti-
abortion laws in nineteenth-century America than Catholic opposition to abortion
did." J. MOHR, supra note 89, at 167.
95 See id. at 37. "[Regular physicians saw in abortion a medical procedure that
not only gave the competition [principally mid-wives] an edge but also undermined
the solidarity of their own regular ranks.... The best way out of these dilemmas was
to persuade state legislators to make abortion a criminal offense. Anti-abortion laws
would weaken the appeal of the competition and take the pressure off the more
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Americans during most of these periods, was never the primary
motivation for abortion laws. Although we do not doubt that argu-
ments based on the moral value of fetuses are sincerely advanced by
many advocates of abortion restrictions, there are other indications
that these arguments mask the influence of restrictive notions of
women's sexual and gender roles in the abortion debate. First, inter-
est in the fetus emerged as a principle justification for abortion laws
only when original expressions of concern for pregnant women's
health became outdated, and second, many proponents of restrictive
abortion laws oppose contraception (a position that will surely
increase the number of abortions). The United States based its Web-
ster argument on the assumption that there was a long tradition of
state action to protect a compelling interest in fetal life from fertiliza-
tion. It turns out, however, that there is no substantial evidence of a
settled consensus through American history that life begins at con-
ception or that abortion laws traditionally reflect a primary or com-
pelling interest in potential human life.
B. Decisionmaker Preference
Given that the historical argument fails, one might recharacter-
ize the state's interest as one of transferring the power to decide
when abortions are appropriate to someone other than the pregnant
woman. The statutory exceptions, and those that arose in practice,
can be seen as an acknowledgment by the state that the abortion
decision is dependent upon context-coupled with a claim that only
the state should decide what the appropriate circumstances are.
The state's interest supporting such laws would only be in trans-
ferring the power to decide from the woman to the legislature, or to
the enforcement discretion of the executive branch, or, in cases like
Doe v. Bolton,96 to a hospital board. This approach reduces the state's
interest from absolute protection of all potential life to a preference
for a particular decisionmaker to determine when the circumstances
for abortion are compelling. Yet, there is little to suggest that the
state is more competent than the pregnant woman to set out what
those individual circumstances might be. When it agrees that there
are some reasons that justify aborting a healthy embryo or fetus, but
simply has a preference for who narrows the list of such reasons, the
state weakens the force of its assertion of the "human life" principle
marginal members of the regulars' own sect." A full account of the history of
abortion may be found in the Amicus Curiae Brief for Historians in Webster.
S16 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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and in the process may undermine any justification for imposing its
judgment on a woman whose fundamental interests are at stake.
C. A Less Absolute Interest in Potentiality of Life
In light of many Americans' sincere beliefs about the sanctity of
fetal life, one might argue that statutory exceptions, under-invest-
ment in prevention of spontaneous abortions, and lax and uneven
enforcement of anti-abortion laws do not imply improper motives,
but rather a laudable yet less absolute state interest in fetal life.
Where such a less weighty interest is at stake, however, the Court
may appropriately find the interest less than compelling, especially
when it must be weighed against the individual right at stake. The
Court took, this approach in the 1986 affirmative action case, Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education.9 7 The Wygant Court found that remedy-
ing societal discrimination, while important and appropriate, was not
compelling when it conflicted other employees' individual rights.9"
Likewise, other recent opinions by the Supreme Court have demon-
strated that laudable interests that clearly might be compelling in the
abstract, may fail to be "compelling" in certain contexts when con-
flicting with certain competing rights.99
While the Wygant Court was simply willing to overrule the state's
substantive judgment that remedying societal discrimination was a
compelling interest, the Court would not have to make a similar
value determination in the abortion context to find the asserted state
interest less than compelling. The Court could simply reach the pro-
cess-oriented conclusion that what the state itself consistently fails to
treat as compelling is not compelling.
Consider, for example, a situation similar to Wisconsin v. Yoder. 100
In Yoder, the state of Wisconsin sought, unsuccessfully, to force the
Amish to send their children to public schools despite the danger
posed to Amish religious practices and traditions. The case was con-
sidered difficult because it pitted the state's compelling interest in
"educating its citizens" against the Amishs' free exercise rights.
97 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
98 See id. at 276 ("Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy.").
99 See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802 (1988) (finding that the state's interest
in protecting victims of sexual abuse is not compelling enough in light of sixth
amendment rights); Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1165 (1988) (noting that a
"powerful" national interest does not rise to the level of compelling when conflicting
with first amendment rights).
100 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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Who could doubt, though, that Yoder would have been easy if Wis-
consin undercut it's asserted compelling interest by making excep-
tions to compulsory school attendance for farm family children,
promising young baseball players, and the children of the elite. No
matter how compelling in the abstract a state's interest in compul-
sory education may be, no court would have found it compelling
enough to override important individual rights without consistent
enforcement.0 l In fact, the judiciary's failure to scrutinize the
asserted state interest in this fashion would allow a state to invoke
any compelling interest-for example, national security, remedying
discrimination, or stopping drugs- anytime it wished to pass a law
invading fundamental rights.
101 The Florida Supreme Court invoked similar reasoning in striking down, on
state constitutional grounds, a parental consent statute. Floridians adopted the
"privacy" provisions in a 1980 referendum. It provides:
Right of privacy.-Every natural person has the right to be let alone and
free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. [The sole exception concerned the public records and
public meeting law].
The Florida Supreme Court unanimously held in In re T.W., A Minor, No. 74-143,
slip op. (Oct. 5, 1989) that this provision guaranteed adult women the right to termi-
nate a pregnancy, noting, "[w]e can hardly conceive a few more personal or private
decisions concerning one's body that one can make in the course of a lifetime .. "
Id. at 10. By a vote of 4-3, the Court also held that under this provision the state
could not require a minor to obtain parental consent, even under a statute that pro-
vided for a judicial by-pass of the consent requirement.
According to the Florida Supreme Court, the central question under the Florida
Constitution, as under the fourteenth amendment, was whether the state could
"prove that the statute [requiring parental consent] further[ed] a compelling state
interest through the least intrusive means." Id. at 11. At issue was whether the state's
asserted interests in "protection of the mature minor and preservation of the family
unit" constituted a sufficiently compelling state interest to override a minor's privacy
right.
In rejecting the state's argument, the Court relied upon the fact that the state did
not generally and uniformly seek to promote such an interest. The Florida Court
noted that under other provisions of Florida law, "a minor child may consent, with-
out parental approval, to any medical procedure involving her pregnancy or her
existing child-no matter how dire the possible consequences-except abortion." Id.
at 15. The Court continued:
"In light of this wide authority that the state grants an unwed minor to
make life-or-death decisions concerning herself or an existing child with-
out parental consent', we are unable to discern a special compelling inter-
est on the part of the state under Florida law in protecting the minor only
where abortion is concerned."
Id.
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court concluded, the "selective approach employed by
the legislature" undercut the state's asserted claim that its parental consent statute
for abortion was in fact necessary to protect a compelling state interest. Id. at 16.
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Some argue that the consideration appropriately given to fetal
life gets stronger as the fetus develops because in the latest stages,
abortions resemble infanticide, or at least, a lack of due societal
respect for something so close to what we think of as a human
infant."0 2 Both of these interests are far less strong, however, where
the fetus is in the earliest stage, and more likely than not to abort
spontaneously. From this perspective, there is a strong reason to
believe that the state's interest in fetal life is neither always compel-
ling or never compelling, but may instead becomes compelling at
some point in the pregnancy. The fact that there is no precise
Euclidean formula for establishing definitely that viability is the point
does not justify abandoning Roe's notion that the state's interest in
the fetus becomes compelling at some point during pregnancy, but
cannot be considered compelling from the moment of conception.
D. Accommodating Compelling Governmental Interests in the Abortion
Context: Less Restrictive Alternatives
Even if the Court found a compelling interest in protecting the
potentiality of life, it does not follow that this interest should always
trump a woman's right to choose to terminate a pregnancy. Basic
constitutional law tells us that where a compelling interest infringes
upon a fundamental right, the state must pursue that interest by the
least restrictive means.'
0 3
Some assume that there can be no least restrictive alternative in
the abortion context. Where the state's interest is to protect all fetal
life, the least restrictive alternative is the outright ban. As we sug-
gested above, however, protecting all fertilized ova does not appear
to have been the states' goal. If a state's objective is a more relative
102 Ironically, the retreat from Roe may spawn restrictions on access to abortion
that principally result in more late abortions. These delays may be substantial as
young, poorly informed, and low-income women postpone securing the required
permission and undertaking a complicated and expensive regulatory process. If
there is a consensus that abortion is more morally troublesome as the entity develops
from a microscopic fertilized ovum to the being that resembles a human infant, rules
that delay abortion make little sense.
Largely as a result of Roe, late abortions have been reduced; 90% of all abortions
now take place during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. Those who are concerned
by abortions late in pregnancy ought to support policies that promote contraception
and facilitate abortion at the earliest possible stage. Upholding medically
unnecessary state and local regulation leads to the opposite result.
103 City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989), was merely the latest
in a line of cases establishing that the government may not intrude on a fundamental
constitutional value without exploring less intrusive means to accomplish its
objective.
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one of discouraging abortion, it could pursue the goal with far less
intrusion on a woman's fundamental liberty.
The Court should expect any state wishing to reduce abortions
to take all appropriate steps short of compelled continuation of a
pregnancy first. It is no secret that the single most effective way to
reduce the number of abortions is by making contraception and edu-
cation about contraception more widely available: in countries
where birth control is more easily accessible, there are far lower
abortion rates than in the United States.1 "4 Some will say that mak-
ing contraceptives more widely available will marginally encourage
sex outside marriage, but even if that doubtful claim had some merit,
that concern could hardly qualify as the compelling government
interest that would allow the state to override a woman's fundamen-
tal liberty. According to the Surgeon General's Report on Abortion,
greater funding for childbearing expenses and the costs of raising
children from unplanned pregnancies will be necessary if we wish to
reduce the number of abortions significantly.10 ' Surely it is constitu-
tionally dubious for a state to select coercive measures with the maxi-
mum destructive impact on women's autonomy as a first step to
discourage abortion.
E. The Limits of Compelling Interest
Even a compelling governmental interest broad enough to
directly and unavoidably clash with a fundamental right does not
necessarily justify it completely trumping the individual right at
stake. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 10 6 the Court recognized that the state's
interest in "[p]roviding public schools ranks at the very apex of the
functions of a State,"1 0 7 but because the Court recognized the
"severe" impact on the "fundamental tenets of [the Amishs'] reli-
104 See Djerassi, The Bitter Pill, 245 SCIENCE 356 (1989). Djerassi writes:
Many people ignore the fact that incident of abortion reflects the state of
contraception. In the Soviet Union, the country with the highest per
capita abortion rate in the world, the quality of birth control is
exceedingly poor and the pill is essentially unavailable. Japan, the country
with the third or fourth highest abortion rate, the only industrialized
country in which the pill is still not approved for contraceptive use. The
United States, finally, has the highest pregnancy and teenage abortion
rate of any industrialized country.
Id. at 358 (footnotes omitted).
105 Surgeon General's Report on Abortion, reprinted in 135 CONG. REC. E906, at
E909 (daily ed. March 21, 1989).
106 406 U.S 205 (1972).
107 Id. at 213.
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gious beliefs,"' 0 8 it insisted that "a State's interest in universal edu-
cation, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing
process when it impinges on fundamental rights .... [T]he State's
interest in universal compulsory education.... is by no means abso-
lute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests."' 0 9
There is a parallel in the abortion context. Even if the Court
accepted the state's assertion of a compelling interest in protecting
all fetal life, a determination we find hard to justify, completely over-
riding the liberty interest in abortion would still be inappropriate
because of its severe limitation on a woman's fundamental right to
choose to bear a child.
Were the Court to refuse to seek any accommodation of a state's
compelling interest with a woman's fundamental liberty interest, the
effect on pregnant women's liberty could be devastating. Imagine,
for example, that a state made the following findings: complete rest
in the first three months of pregnancy reduced miscarriages by 9%,
and working at video display terminals increased miscarriages by
4%. On these bases the state passed a law prohibiting all pregnant
women from working at display terminals or working anywhere more
than four hours a day during the first three months of pregnancy.
In both of these cases, if the state justified the imposition by
asserting its compelling governmental interest in protecting all fetal
life, it could contend that there was no less restrictive alternative to
this seemingly Draconian measure. As long as the compelling inter-
est was protecting all fetal life, a state or local government could
assert that any attempt at a less restrictive alternative would unavoid-
ably result in the loss of some early fetuses. Furthermore, if the plu-
rality successfully pushes the Court to simply retracting the
fundamental right to abortion, the hypothetical state or local govern-
ment would only need to proffer a minimal, rational justification for
these excessive burdens. It is hard to imagine that confronted with
such a regulation, the Court would not feel compelled, in light of the
excessive burden on women's liberty, to somehow seek an accommo-
dation between these two conflicting values.
108 See id. at 218.
109 See id. at 214-15. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1945), the
Court seemed affected by the fact that if it upheld the state's interest in the license
tax, it could completely wipe out an integral practice of some religions. "The spread
of religious ideas through personal visitations" can, by the widespread use of license
taxes, "be crushed and closed out by the sheer weight of the toll ... exacted town by
town." Id. at 115.
[Vol. 138:83
THE RETREAT FROM ROE V. WADE
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Harlan once wrote: "[T]he mere assertion that the
action of the State finds justification in the controversial realm of
morals cannot justify alone any and every restriction it imposes."' to
The burden rests on state and local governments to demonstrate the
existence of a governmental interest sufficient to justify the massive
intervention of compelled childbirth. The case has not been made.
Indeed, states have barely attempted, in Webster or elsewhere, to
establish that restrictive abortion laws actually effectuate a compel-
ling governmental interest. Coercive abortion laws are uienforce-
able against the state's more affluent citizens and foreseeably create
hundreds of thousands of criminals out of otherwise law-abiding citi-
zens. 1 1 In reality, abortion regulation prior to Roe did not consist-
ently protect potential life. Safe abortions were available, but only to
women who were sufficiently wealthy or well-informed, arid even for
the wealthy, the alternatives were often traumatic. For those less
well off, the choices were far bleaker. Stories of that period are pain-
ful to recount: tales of desperate women; of frantic searches to find
someone willing to perform a criminal operation; of frightening trips
to dangerous locations in strange parts of town; of whiskey as an
anesthetic; of "doctors" who were often marginal or unlicensed
practitioners, sometimes alcoholic, sometimes sexually abusive;
unsanitary conditions; incompetent treatment; infection; hemor-
rhage; disfiguration; and death.' 
12
The claim that restrictive abortion laws effectively advance a set-
I10 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
I II In evaluating' a state's asserted compelling interest, the Court has
considered a state's unwillingness or inability to effectuate its interest because people
will foreseeably violate or avoid any law. In Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250, 268 (1974), the Court found that the state's interest in using a waiting
period to prevent fraud less than compelling because "[a]n indigent applicant intent
on committing fraud could as easily swear to having been a resident of the county the
previous year as to being one currently." In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Court found that
the state's asserted interest in banning advertising for pharmaceuticals was greatly
undermined by the fact that "[t]here is no claim that the advertising ban in any way
prevents the cutting of comers by the pharmacist who is so inclined. That
pharmacist is likely to cut comers in any event." Id. at 769.
Surely, if the Court will consider the inevitability of welfare recipients and
pharmacists cheating when determining what interests justify infringing on
fundamental rights, the Court should consider the inevitability of affluent women
flying to other jurisdictions, and more desperate women seeking dangerous back-
alley abortions when deciding the abortion question.
I12 See Brief for the Amici Curiae Woman who have had Abortions and Friends
of Amici Curiae in support of Appellees, at B I-B92, Webster v. Reproductive Health
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tled state policy that there is a compelling interest in all fertilized ova
from the moment of conception is not easily reconciled with the stat-
utes themselves, with their inconsistent enforcement, and with a his-
tory showing that considerations other than human life prompted
most 19th and early 20th century abortion laws. At oral argument in
Roe, the attorney for the State of Texas conceded that he had "no
idea" what the purpose of the Texas legislature had been when it
enacted the state's restrictive abortion law.' 13 Although many indi-
viduals believe that life begins at the moment of conception, defend-
ers of restrictive abortion laws have failed to establish that there has
ever been any such policy, stable over times and across boundaries,
recognizing this belief. An interest pursued only by some states in
some decades, and even then in an inconsistent and economically
discriminatory fashion can hardly qualify as a compelling govern-
mental interest. As one lower court noted when it struck down Con-
necticut's anti-abortion statute in 1972, "A compelling state interest
has generally been one where the nature of the interest was broadly
accepted .... No decision of the Supreme Court has ever permitted
anyone's constitutional right to be directly abridged to protect a
state interest which is subject to such a variety of personal
judgments."114
None, that is, before now.
Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (letters from women or family members describing
experiences with illegal abortions).
113 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 800 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975).
114 Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 230 (D. Conn. 1972).
